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HOW IS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MADE?
Tracey E. George*
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.**
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE A NALYSIS OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING. By Maxwell L. Stearns. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2000. Pp. ix, 420. $65.

Bismarck famously remarked: "Laws are like sausages. It's better
not to see them being made."1 This witticism applies with peculiar
force to constitutional law. Judges and commentators examine the
sausage (the Supreme Court's doctrine), but ignore the messy details
of its production.
Maxwell Stearns has demonstrated, with brilliant originality, that
the Court fashions constitutional law through process-based rules of
decision such as outcome voting, stare decisis, and justiciability. Em
ploying "social choice" economic theory, Professor Stearns argues that
the Court, like all multimember decisionmaking bodies, strives to for
mulate rules that promote both rationality and fairness (p. 4).
Viewed through the lens of social choice, the Court's constitutional
precedent becomes more coherent. Stearns aims to present an account
that is "positive" (i.e., justifies the Court's rules based upon the his
torical and case evidence) rather than "normative" (i.e., criticizes the
substantive content of those rules) (pp. 6, 63-67). In particular, Stearns
logically explains the decisions involving "standing" (i.e., whether a
plaintiff has the right to sue), which legal scholars have uniformly con
cluded are irreconcilable and thus reflect either intellectual sloppiness
or unstated political motives.
Professor Stearns's thesis is radical, for it compels us to look at
constitutional law in an entirely new way. At the same time, however,
his approach is conservative because it depends on the pre-Realist
premise that constitutional "law" consists of binding legal rules that
the justices try to interpret and apply in a principled way. Unlike many
academics, Stearns "takes the justices' own statements of doctrine, as
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expressed in their opinions, quite seriously" (p. 5) and attempts to jus
tify them using social choice analysis.2
Stearns displays a unique ability to convey extremely complex le
gal, economic, and political ideas in a clear and precise manner. His
work is especially valuable because it is accessible to scholars in a va
riety of fields, and it will. force them to reconsider their analytical
frameworks.
Perhaps the greatest strength of Stearns's book is that he presents
a grand unified theory of the Court's rules of constitutional process
and the resulting development of doctrine. This strength can also be a
weakness, however, because he tends to read precedent and the his
torical evidence to fit his thesis, even when other explanations might
be more persuasive.
In this Review, we will explore two such alternatives, grounded in
political science and constitutional theory. We hope to show that these
disciplines are at least as effective as economics in illuminating consti
tutional lawmaking.
I.

POSITIVE THEORIES OF APPELLATE COURT DECISIONMAKING

Positive models of Supreme Court decisionmaking begin with the
rational choice paradigm: that individuals make decisions that they
believe are most likely to lead to their preferred outcomes. Political
scientists who study appellate courts have debated the relevance of a
court's collegial nature to its decisions. Stearns adds to this literature
by focusing on a classical economic theory of collective decisionmak
ing, Arrow's Theorem.3 He uses Arrow's voting paradox in both its
normative sense (as Arrow originally proposed it) and its positive
sense, as it has been employed by social scientists ever since.4

2. Stearns recognizes that politics and ideology influence adjudication, but contends that
the justices aim to resolve the dispositive case issues in a legally consistent way: "I take doc
trine seriously not because I believe that doctrine neutrally drives case results, but rather
because I believe doctrine serves as one of several important constraints that influence the
manner in which justices achieve desired case outcomes." P. 5.
3. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
4. Stearns attempts to distinguish between normative "legitimacy" (i.e., society's accep
tance of an outcome because of the fairness of the procedures followed) and normative "jus
tification" (i.e., the merits of a result as compared to foregone alternatives). Pp. 63-67. This
argument fails to persuade within the social choice framework. He uses "normative" in the
first instance in a different sense than it is employed in the second - process rules cannot
produce normatively acceptable outcomes (under social choice theory) unless they are con
sistent with the goals of decisionmaking considered by Arrow. It may be true that the public
perceives outcomes as legitimate because. they were reached by following predetermined
rules. This is a positive account, however, not a normative one. Whether the public should
have this perception is a question that goes to the normative justification for the outcomes.
Stearns's arguments about the rightness of rules that resolve the voting paradox are norma
tive, of course.

May 2002]

How Is Constitutional Law Made?

1267

Initially, we consider the central aspect of Arrow's theory of social
choice upon which Stearns relies to create his process model. We then
examine whether existing political science accounts of Court decisions
provide a sounder, more tractable model.
A. Arrow's Insights into Group Decisionmaking
1.

Introduction

Scholarship built upon Arrow's Theorem (or its descendants) has
traveled · under various banners, including public choice or social
choice theory,5 but shares a herita·ge in the work of Arrow and Duncan
Black.6 Arrow proved that no collective decisionmaking process could
both satisfy accepted notions of fairness and produce a consistent or
"rational" outcome, that is, one that would meet the requisites for ra
tionality in individual decisionmaking.7 Most notably, he demonstrated
mathematically that aggregating collective preferences according to
democratic methods, such as majority rule, will not always yield a sin
gle, transitive collective preference.8 As a result, the decisionmaking
process "cycles," moving through a series of options without ever
clearly selecting one. The result is the classic "voting paradox," first

5. The economic theory of group decisionmaking has assumed many labels, including
social choice, public choice, collective choice, or positive political theory. Saul Levmore,
Preface, in MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND
COMMENTARY xvii, xi (1997). For a discussion of the schizophrenic naming and defining of
the school, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in
the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992) (discussing the academic debate over the precise
meaning of the terms "public choice," "social choice," and "positive political theory," which
clearly share "familial" connections).
6. For the classic texts by each author, see ARROW, supra note 3; and DUNCAN BLACK,
THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958). Daniel Farber, a legal scholar who
has written extensively on social choice, observed: "Kenneth Arrow is undoubtedly the pa
terfamilias of social choice theory . . . . Arrow's Theorem is the foundation for what is now a
huge body of literature on mechanisms of social choice." Daniel S. Farber, Positive Theory
as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. RE V. 1565, 1573 (1995). For a law review discussion of
Black's contribution, see Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and
the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971 (1989).
7. Arrow's "General Possibility" or Impossibility Theorem demonstrates that no
method of summing individual preferences can satisfy basic notions of justice and fairness as
reflected in five maxims: universal admissibility of individual preference scales, positive as
sociation of individual and social values, independence from irrelevant alternatives, individ
ual sovereignty, and nondictatorship. For an intriguing account of Arrow's recognition of the
voting paradox, see his autobiographical essay in LI VES OF THE LAUREATES: THIRTEEN
NOBEL ECONOMISTS 47-49 (William Breit & Roger W. Spencer eds., 3rd ed. 1995) (hereinaf
ter ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES].
8. ARROW, supra note 3, at 2-3; see also DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SCHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE 7-8 (1994) (noting that Arrow's theory "rendered all democratic rules
of collective decision potentially suspect" because they fail to achieve their seeming end:
popular choice).
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recognized by the Marquis de Condorcet in 1785 but largely forgotten
until Arrow revived it.9
Cycling is easy to illustrate. Imagine three individuals, A, B, and C,
who must make a group decision among three options. A ranks her
preferences 1, 2, 3; B ranks his preferences 2, 3, 1; and C ranks her
preferences 3, 1, 2. In a pairwise vote between choices 1 and 2, choice
1 prevails. In a vote between choices 2 and 3, choice 2 prevails. If -the
group's preferences were rational, it would prefer choice 1 to 3, that is,
its preferences would be transitive. In a vote between 1 and 3, how
ever, choice 3 prevails.10 If all three individuals vote sincerely in accor
dance with their preferences, there is no rational means of choosing
one option, and thus there is no "Condorcet winner." No minimum
winning majority can withstand a challenge by the losing participant,
who can always entice one member of the majority to support a differ
ent option. For example, if choice 1 prevails, B can persuade C to form
a new majority in favor of choice 3. If choice 3 prevails, A can per
suade B to shift to choice 2, and so forth. The majority cycles.
2.

Arrow's Theorem in Legal Scholarship

While many social scientists immediately began to utilize Arrow's
work on collective decisionmaking,11 law professors were not as quick
to appreciate its relevance to their studies. Beginning in the mid-1970s
and picking up speed in the last decade,12 legal scholars have sought to
evaluate law and legal structures by considering how institutional
characteristics influence collective choice.13 Since 1986, more than 100
9. See ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES, supra note 7, at 50 (describing his surprise
at learning, after circulating his own work, that "[t]he paradox of majority voting had indeed
been discovered before - in fact, by the French author the Marquis du Condorcet in
1785!"); H.P. Young, Condorcet's Theory of Voting, 82 AM. POL. SCI. RE V. 1231 (1988). In
the original book, Arrow credits E.J. Nanson with first recognizing the paradox in 1882.
ARROW, supra note 3, at 3 n.3.
10. The group members' preferences are "multipeaked". STE VEN J. BRAMS,
PARADOXES IN POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NONOB VIOUS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
37-41 (1976) (discussing single-peakedness and multi-peakedness as discovered by Duncan
Black).
11. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL vALVES i (2d ed. 1963)
(observing in the preface to the second edition that Social Choice and Individual Values "has
to some extent acquired a life of its own" and thus choosing in the second edition to append
material responding to commentary on the book, rather than rewrite the main text);
ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES, supra note 7, at 51 (describing the voluminous work
built on social choice theory).
12. David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal
Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 659-60 (1997) (book review) ("It was not until the mid1970s that legal scholars first explored the implications of public choice, even though many
of the seminal insights of both interest group theory and social choice had been in place for
over a decade. Since then, public choice has taken the legal literature by storm.").
13. For example, legal scholars have invoked social choice principles to argue that the
legislative process is inherently flawed, thereby justifying greater Supreme Court interven-
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law review articles have included "social choice" or "public choice" in
their titles, and more than 400 articles have cited Arrow's classic text,
Social Choice and Individual Values. 14 Within the past decade, law
journals have devoted entire issues to articles on the application of
choice theory to the study of law .15
Frank Easterbrook was the first legal commentator to view the de
cisionmaking of collegial courts from a social choice perspective.16
Since then various legal scholars have recognized that multijudge ap
pellate courts may be subject to decisionmaking flaws predicted by so
cial choice theory and have considered the resulting implications for
normative adjudication theories.17 Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence
Sager, for example, have drawn on Arrow's Theorem to examine
whether the features of collegial courts satisfy the normative goals of
adjudication.18 David Post and Steven Salop have argued that such
courts should adopt a system of "issue voting" as opposed to "out
come voting" to overcome the voting paradox.19 Steams contributes to
this important body of work.

tion. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (drawing in part on public choice ideas to support wide-ranging
judicial activism under the Takings Clause); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation:
Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980) (using interest group analy
sis to justify more intrusive judicial review of legislation for rationality). Scholars have also
taken the contrary position - that legislatures are as well or better suited than appellate
courts to reach rational decisions. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Einer R. El
hauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31
(1991).
14. These findings are based on a search of WESTLAW JLR database.
15. See, e.g., Public Choice Theme Issue, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 709 (1998); Sympo
sium: Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787 (1992); Symposium on
Public Choice and the Judiciary, 1990 BYU L. REV. 729; Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice, 74 v A. L. REV. 167 (1988); see also MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997) (an edited reader supplemented with a
discussion of economic concepts relevant to legal decisionmaking).
16. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802,
813-32 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L.
ECON. & 0RG. 441 (1992).
18. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Un
packing the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986).
19. David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by
Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743 (1992). For a thoughtful critique, see John M. Rogers,
"Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response to Some Radical Proposals, 49
VAND. L. REV. 997 (1996) and David G. Post & Steven C. Salop, Issues and Outcomes,
Guidance, and Indeterminancy: A Reply to Professor Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1069 (1996).

1270

Michigan Law Review

3.

[Vol. 100:1265

Stearns's Adaptation ofA rrow 's Theorem

In previous articles, Stearns demonstrated that he is particularly
adept at articulating and applying the precepts of social choice the
ory.20 His delineation of the voting paradox in the current book is out
standing and will be a great resource for anyone seeking to understand
Condorcet's and Arrow's ideas (pp. 42-52, 81-94). Stearns creatively
elucidates a number of complicated social choice concepts, making
them both accessible and interesting. Perhaps his best effort is his
modern revision of Shakespeare's tale of King Lear to illustrate the
"empty core" problem.21
The driving force of Stearns's book is his argument that appellate
courts, as collective decisionmaking bodies, are governed by Arrow's
Theorem and therefore are prone to cycling. He presents a group of
Supreme Court procedural doctrines that he maintains can be ex
plained and justified as responses to cycling and related social choice
conundrums. For example, outcome voting, rather than issue voting,
ensures that the Court will reach a decision even when no stable ma
jority of justices can agree both on the means (issue) and the ends
(outcome) in a particular case (pp. 97-1 11). In instances where only
outcome voting would lead to a decision, the narrowest grounds doc
trine offers a fair interpretation of the Court's holding in the case be
cause it limits the ruling to the position that was at least the second
best choice of a majority of justices (pp. 124-29).
Stearns scrutinizes a handful of cases in order to prove that this so
cial choice account of outcome voting and the narrowest grounds doc
trine is an accurate positive theory. His reasoning, however, is primar
ily normative, not explanatory. Most significantly, he does not prove
that outcome voting developed to respond to cycling problems; in fact,
he does not offer a historical account for its emergence (although it
seems an obvious default rule). Rather, Stearns provides a justification
for keeping the outcome voting rule. The narrowest grounds doctrine
also appears to have been adopted for largely pragmatic reasons:
judges do not know ex arite their relative position in future cases, and
therefore they select a rule that is least likely to be completely con
trary to their future decisions. Rational choice theory offers the best

20. See, e.g. , Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: His
torical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renais
sance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).
21. Pp. 54-58. Cycling can be seen as one instance of the "empty core" phenomenon. A
bargaining situation requiring a majority agreement contains an empty core when a partici
pant may be persuaded to defect from an agreement by the offer of a bigger share and such
defection changes the majority agreement.
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explanation for this selection.22 Again, Stearns sets forth a compelling
rationalization for the narrowest grounds doctrine, but not an explana
tion for it.
Stearns correctly argues that the most important rules of constitu
tional decisionmaking concern "justiciability" - the fitness of a mat
ter for judicial disposition (pp. 35-38, 157-211). The key doctrine i;!
standing, which denies federal court access to any plaintiff who cannot
show an "injury in fact" caused by the defendant that is judicially re
dressable (pp. 37-38, 160-70). Stearns's most original contribution is to
apply his social choice approach to standing (Chapters Five and Six).
He argues that standing is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of
stare decisis. He contends that the rule of stare decisis is similar to the
rule of outcome voting in that both respond to the problem of cycling:
outcome voting addresses cycling within cases, while stare decisis re
sponds to cycling across cases (pp. 158, 170-77).
Stare decisis, however, poses its own social choice dilemma, "path
dependency": parties, particularly organized interests, can manipulate
the development of substantive legal doctrine by presenting cases in a
predetermined order and thereby restrain the Court, which is bound
by its precedent.23 One of Arrow's prerequisites for fair group deci
sionmaking is that the decision should be independent of the order of
presentation of alternatives. Stare decisis, coupled with sophisticated
litigation strategies, violates this requirement. This conclusion under
girds Stearns's central thesis: that standing doctrine allows the Court
to impede parties' attempts at path manipulation by making it more
difficult to present cases on their merits (p. 159). Specifically, standing
helps ensure that the order in which cases are presented is primarily
determined not by litigant strategy, but by chance events directly in
juring plaintiff and beyond her control (pp. 23-24, 157, 159, 162, 17780, 198, 204, 208).
As with outcome voting and the narrowest grounds doctrine,
Stearns provides a compelling normative justification for stare decisis
and standing, but his case studies do not persuasively explain the de
velopment or utilization of these doctrines. A more appealing, direct
account as to why courts respect precedent is the desire for fairness:
similarly situated parties should be treated alike. Moreover, consistent
decisionmaking is a hallmark of rationality and contributes to a court's
legitimacy. Again, the simple "rational actor" model explains judicial
22. These two doctrines seem to be instances of the strategic theory of judicial behavior
as developed in political science, which we wilLdiscuss in the next section. We do not, how
ever, offer a detailed account of its ability to explain outcome voting or the narrowest
grounds rule because that would exceed the scope of this Review.
23. Pp. 177-80. Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund developed this
test case litigation strategy with great success. See generally CLEMENT E. VOSE,
CAUCASIANS 0NLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE
COVENANT CASES (1959).
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behavior. Indeed, the standing doctrine can be explained by a par
ticular rational choice theory developed in political science, as de
scribed below.
In our view, Stearns's approach does not function well as a positive
theory because it is not a true model of Supreme Court decisionmak
ing, in the sense that it is not falsifiable. His theory fails to provide ex
ante for any potential conditions that, if observed, would refute the
model.
4.

Some Conclusions About the Social Choice Theory

Stearns's work on the Supreme Court has been anticipated by so
cial science studies of majority rule institutions, which focus primarily
on legislatures. Social scientists have demonstrated that strict majority
rule in a setting where individuals hold some diversity of viewpoints
generally does not produce a Condorcet winner.24 Thus, cycling is in
evitable on a theoretical level when groups make even the simplest
decision among multidimensional options. Nevertheless, cycling does
not appear frequently in practice because most majority rule institu
tions adopt anticycling procedures or include strategic members who
act in such a way as to offset the cycling problem.25 Or, as may be the
case with the Supreme Court, the members hold a limited number of
positions26 and/or are selecting among a smaller or limited range of op
tions.27
24. See Linda Cohen, Cyclic Sets in Multidimensional Voting Models, 20 J. ECON.
THEORY 1 (1979); Richard D. McKelvey, General Conditions for Global lntransitivities in
Formal Voting Models, 47 ECONOMETRICA 1085 (1979); Norman Schofield, Instability of
Simple Dynamic Games, 45 REV. ECON. STUDIES 575 (1978).
25. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting
Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 49, 49, 69 (1984).
Shepsle and Weingast's study provides an important insight to majority rule with open
agenda setting (i.e., any justice may introduce any alternative at any point in the decision
making process): If two options are placed on the agenda where one option encompasses the
other, then the more encompassing option is the sophisticated outcome. Id. at 68-69. A so
phisticated voter would propose that alternative in order to capture additional votes.
26. Heterogenity of preferences is a prerequisite to cycling. See, e.g. , BRAMS, supra note
10, at 41; Frank DeMeyer & Charles R. Plott, The Probability of a Cyclical Majority, 38
ECONOMETRICA 345, 345 (1970).
27. It is common to imagine judges selecting along a unidimensional decisional space, as
one of us has done in her work. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the
Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999). In such a setting, cycling
does not occur because the judges' relative positions are defined in such a way that the ma
jority's preferences are transitive. The literature on majority rule cycles is set in the context
of multidimensional voting space. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Institutionaliz
ing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 367
(1982). Judicial process scholars have considered the influence of case complexity on the
likelihood of justices circulating separate opinions and noted how their finding - a high
positive relationship - is consistent with Arrow's Theorem regarding the instability of ma
jorities in multidimensional issue areas. FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON
THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 90-91 (2000).
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Stearns obviously has given much thought and energy to the sub
tleties of social choice theory and the possibilities that arise by apply
ing this theory to Supreme Court decisionmaking. The resulting ideas
are keenly original and innovative.
The social choice approach, however, does less than Stearns claims
for it. He presents his account as a metatheory that both provides a
model of process doctrines and outperforms other models of these
doctrines. Although Stearns comprehensively analyzes all the perti
nent decisions, we believe that his theory best explains a group of un
usual cases rather than the standard doctrines. Political science pro
vides a stronger, more tractable model of process doctrine generally.
Stearns's theory may supplement that model, but fails to supplant it.
B.

The Insights of Political Science About Collegial Courts

1.

Attitudinal and Strategic Theories ofJudicial Behavior

To answer the question of how judges make decisions, political sci
entists have developed two competing models: attitudinal and strate
gic. Both models begin with the recognition. that judges are at core
human decisionmakers, and rational choice theory tells us that judges,
like human beings generally, will seek to achieve their goals or prefer
ences. Thus, both political science models build on the same base as
the social choice one: the rational actor.
The attitudinal model posits that a judge seeks to maximize her
sincere policy preferences, termed "attitudes".28 This model has been
the dominant positive theory of court behavior because empirical
studies demonstrate that it has substantial explanqtory power.29 Most
adherents of the model will concede that it does not account for all
factors in judicial decisionmaking30 and acknowledge that legal rules
and doctrines have been shown to restrain, and in some instances to
guide, adjudication.31 But they point out that the attitudinal model is a
valuable tool for explaining and predicting judicial behavior.
Strategic theorists argue that the attitudinal model can be im
proved without unnecessarily complicating it or detracting from its
28. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (offering a detailed delineation and defense of the attitu
dinal model).
29. See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionrnaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1646-55 (1998) (detailing the evolution and status
of the attitudinal model); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325-26 (1992) (considering the relevance of
legal factors to the attitudinal account). See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 28.
30. In fact, models are inherently incomplete, a simplified and useful construct of real
ity. A "model" that included every characteristic of the object of study would not be a model
but would rather be the thing itself.
31. See, e.g. , George & Epstein, supra note 29.
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predictive ability.32 Strategic theories of judicial behavior adopt the at
titudinalist position that justices seek to achieve policy goals but claim
that justices, in order to accomplish this end, must and do consider the
preferences and likely conduct of other relevant actors. Hence, strate
gic theorists emphasize the influence of strategic factors, such as inter
actions with colleagues on the court (internal dynamics) or reactions
of other institutional actors, most notably Congress and the President
(exogenous constraints).33 Such strategic considerations are absent
from Arrow's Theorem. Arrow assumed that preferences were not af
fected by the decisionmaking process, and he therefore ignored strate
gic (or game) aspects of the process that would prevent someone from
voting his or her true, or sincere, preference.34 Relaxing either or both
assumptions - as the strategic theory of judicial process does -: will
prevent cycling.
·

2.

An Attitudinal Account of Standing Doctrine

A major aspect of Stearns's work is his positive explanation for the
development of the standing doctrine, which assertedly harmonizes
most of the relevant cases and thereby improves on existing theories
(Chapter Six). In our view, however, the attitudinal model provides a
simpler, more intuitive explanation for standing decisions. It can ac
count for the Supreme Court justices' votes on standing by reference
to their preference to favor. or disfavor sociopolitical underdogs. Lib
eral justices are far more likely than their conservative counterparts to
grant standing to those who are of disadvantaged social or economic
status, such as the poor, ethnic minorities, employees, and criminals.
Conversely, conservative justices are more likely than their liberal
colleagues to confer standing on the powerful.
Consider, for example, the New Deal and Burger Court decisions
that adopted very strict standing requirements. Stearns deems these
cases surprising because of the two Courts' contrasting policy prefer
ences.35 As we will detail in Part II, the Court created standing in the
32. See, e.g. , LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998);
WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); Forrest Maltzman & Paul
Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 581 (1996).
33. See Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II, & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Judicial
Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making (providing an
articulate primer on, and argument for, strategic theory) in SUPREME COURT DECISION
MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell w. Clayton & Howard Gillman
eds., 1999).
34. ARROW, supra note 3, at 6-8.
35. Pp. 35-38. One of the problems with Stearns's explanation of the standing decisions
is that the rules he vaunts are merely what the Court allows us to see of its decisionmaking
processes, the great majority of which are entirely secret. It is hard to conceive of these rules,
then, as meaningful constraints on judicial behavior when most of that behavior is veiled and
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1930s and 1940s primarily to deny federal judicial access to businesses
challenging progressive legislation.36 By contrast, the Burger Court
used standing mainly to foreclose litigation by disadvantaged groups
attacking conservative statutes.37 Nonetheless, the New Deal and
Burger Courts did share an important feature: both wanted to protect
other governmental actors. Access doctrines like standing allow the
Court to deny relief to those seeking to challenge existing political
power arrangements. Thus, the Court's treatment of standing is irre
trievably linked to its position on those with access to power in the
first instance.
Moreover, Stearns's process theory is unnecessarily complex. The
attitudinal model explains both the New Deal and the
Burger/Rehnquist Courts' reliance on standing to protect liberal and
conservative legislation, respectively. The attitudinal approach does so
with less complexity than a social choice model. Stearns does not
achieve greater overall success in predicting Court behavior. If a sim
ple paradigm explains the observed events as accurately as a more
complicated and less obvious approach, then the former should be
preferred.38 While it is true that humari behavior is complex, it need
not be made more so.
Admittedly, Stearns's process model improves upon existing mod
els of judicial behavior by adding to them and creating a more com
plete theory. Therefore, social choice is not "the" explanation, but
rather is part of several complementary theories (including the attitu
dinal one) that can account for the observed outcomes. Hence, when
combined, these approaches result . in a multidimensional, fully real•

the part we see is carefully choreographed to ensure the appearance of principled decision
making.
36. See infra Section 11.B.l.
37. For example, the Burger Court held that plaintiffs must establish a direct relation

ship between the challenged action and a personal injury and must show that the requested
remedy will redress that injury. This requirement prevented blacks from challenging alleg
edly discriminatory police practices, see, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), and
restrictive zoning ordinances in white neighborhoods, see, e.g. , Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975), as well as the poor from contesting government welfare procedures, see, e.g. , Simon
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
38. Clearly, this is the principle of Occam's Razor. Isaac Newton stated as his first rule
of philosophizing: "That there ought not be admitted any more causes of natural things than
those which are both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena." ISAAC NEWTON,
PRINCIPIA: THE SYSTEM OF THE WORLD, reprinted in DANA DENSMORE, NEWTON'S
PRINCIPIA: THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT: TRANSLATION, NOTES, AND EXPANDED PROOFS
241 (1995) (translations and diagrams by William H. Donohue). As Stephen Hawking ex
plains: "It seems better to employ the principle of economy known as Occam's razor and cut
out all the features of the theory which cannot be observed." STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES 55 (1988).

Michigan Law Review

1276

[Vol. 100:1265

ized model of judicial behavior that no model alone can capture.39 We
will now explore other theories that further enrich our understanding.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND HISTORY

A. The Social Choice Approach to Standing
1.

Professor Stearns's Conception of Standing

Stearns presents a novel theoretical and historical account of
standing. He begins with Steven Winter's definitive history of this doc
trine, which posits that the liberal Supreme Court developed standing
to prevent attacks on progressive legislation that began with the New
Deal and continued with the Great Society.40 Professor Steams asks a
penetrating question: Why did the conservative Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, which distrust government regulation, retain and strengthen
standing doctrine instead of abandoning or limiting it (pp. 35-38, 16768)?
He finds the answer in social choice theory: through standing, the
Court has consistently rejected attempts to conduct litigation on an
ideological basis, whether liberal or conservative (pp. 159, 162-64, 16870, 198, 204-11). Steams sees standing as operating on two levels.
First, as noted above, standing improves fairness by reducing the
ability of interest groups to manipulate the evolution of legal doctrine
by controlling the order of case decisions - a "path dependency" that
results from stare decisis (pp. 157-62, 177-80, 190-91, 198, 204, 208-11).
The accidental occurrence of an individualized injury, not lawyerly
calculation, largely determines when a federal court grants access.41
Second, standing promotes separation of powers by minimizing at
tempts to force judicial creation of positive law where Congress has
remained silent, thereby protecting its power to leave legal issues un
decided until a legislative consensus has formed (pp. 158-59, 164-66,
198, 201, 209). Standing thus helps to preserve the fundamental consti
tutional structural distinction between legislative and judicial law
making processes (pp. 159-60, 198-211). Congress has power to create
(or decline to create) law as it sees fit, to aggregate preferences, and to
control the timing and scope of its legislation (pp. 159, 201-02). By
contrast, courts fashion law only on an ad hoc basis when necessary to
decide an actual case, and they are limited to applying legal principles
rather than personal preferences (pp. 201-03).
39. Social scientists have observed that some law and economics scholars mistakenly
believe that they must present a theory that beats other theories and exists instead of those
theories. Such an approach is both unscientific and incomplete.
40. Pp. 35-37, 167. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
41. See supra Section l.A.3.
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Stearns characterizes "injury" as a metaphor to describe when for
tuitous circumstances have harmed a plaintiff seriously enough to jus
tify shifting the burden of legislative inertia and allowing a court to
formulate positive law (pp. 204-11, 257-59, 262-65, 268-69). Accord
ingly, standing enables doctrine to evolve more fairly and consistently
with the "majoritarian norm" of democratic lawmaking (p. 300).
Stearns applies this social choice theory to the three main catego
ries of standing cases. First, he endorses the precedent prohibiting
third party standing as promoting fairness and reducing manipulation
(pp. 162-64, 249-50, 259-69). One illustration is the Court's denial to
the Sierra Club of the right to claim that a construction project had
violated federal environmental laws because the Club failed to allege
that its members actually had used the national park that would be
negatively affected by the building.42 Stearns concludes that the Court
correctly held that a park patron, rather than a special interest group,
would be the appropriate plaintiff (pp. 263-66, 277-78). He therefore
rejects the scholarly consensus that Sierra Club invented a pleading
technicality to express the majority's political antipathy towards environmentalists.43
Second, Stearns contends that the Court's ban on "generalized
grievances" ensures fairness by forcing the most majoritarian depart
ment to deal with illegal government conduct that produces diffuse
harms, rather than allowing ideological litigants to commandeer the
least representative branch to make positive law (pp. 250, 269-71 ). He
asserts, for example, that the Court properly denied standing to "tax
payers" and "citizens" who claimed that (1) a statute authorizing se
cret CIA spending violated the Constitution's requirement that
Congress provide a public accounting;44 (2) Representatives' simulta
neous membership in the military reserves ignored a constitutional
prohibition on such dual service;45 and (3) the government's grant of
property to a religious institution ran afoul of the Establishment
·

42. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
43. Pp. 263-66. Stearns emphasizes that the Sierra Club did not invoke any specific fed

eral statute whose violation had harmed them in a way that conferred standing, but rather
merely claimed to be "adversely affected" by agency action under the catch-all standing pro
vision of the Administrative Procedures Act. Pp. 259, 263-66, 268-69. He contrasts United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), in which
the plaintiffs relied upon the National Environmental Policy Act, which broadly granted
standing. Pp. 264-66. A denial of standing may have left the statute unenforceable by any
one, whereas in Sierra Club, park users could still have brought suit. Pp. 265-66.
44. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see also id. at 179 (declaring
that "the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to
the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ulti
mately to the political process").

45. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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Clause.46 Steams argues that the alleged constitutional violations in
these three cases did not directly harm any particular citizen in a man
ner substantial enough to warrant a grant of standing and thus an as
sumption by courts of lawmaking power (pp. 168-69, 269-70). Again,
he questions the prevailing wisdom that these cases simply reflected
hostility toward antiwar activists and strict separationists (pp. 167-69,
233, 269-70).
Third, Steams characterizes standing's "causation" and "redress
ability" prongs as shorthand for denying anyone the right to allege
that unlawful government conduct has created a market distortion, the
removal of which will benefit the plaintiff (pp. 250, 271-79). For in
stance, in Allen v. Wright,41 the Court conceded that IRS tax exemp
tions to discriminatory private schools had constitutionally injured
black public school children by diminishing their ability to receive an
integrated education.48 Nonetheless, the majority denied standing be
cause the plaintiffs had not shown that the IRS, as distinguished from
the private schools and their parental supporters, had caused their in
jury.49 The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were making a general
complaint about an executive agency's internal program.50 Steams
agrees that citizens should ask the political branches, not the courts, to
eliminate market distortions such as the one created by the IRS ex
emption (pp. 32-35, 271-77, 279).
2.

A General Critique of the Social Choice Approach

Steams's theory has considerable explanatory power. Nonetheless,
it rests upon two debatable premises.
The first is that the Court applies standing in a relatively apolitical
manner to repel all ideological litigants. If this is true, however, why
did the Warren Court in Flast v. Cohen51 break with ironclad prece
dent and allow taxpayers to claim that congressional spending for
church-run schools violated the Establishment Clause? Was it not for
the transparent purpose of furthering the Court's liberal agenda of
ending public support for religion? Conversely, didn't the Burger
Court serve conservative political ends (and eviscerate Flast) by re
jecting the standing of taxpayers to question the federal government's

46. See Valley Forge Christian Coll.
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
47. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
48. Id. at 756.
49. Id. at 757-59.
50. Id. at 760-61.
.51. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

v.

Arns. United for Separation of Church & State,
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grant of property to a Christian college?52 Similarly, why was the
Court in the 1950s and 1960s so solicitous of minorities, whereas by
the 1970s and 1980s it was denying standing to blacks and Latinos who
alleged unconstitutional discrimination in taxation53 and housing poli
cies?54 Finally, why have the Burger and Rehnquist Courts routinely
rejected the standing of those who seek to protect the environment,55
but not those who wish to degrade it?56
Although Stearns plausibly answers such questions through com
plex social choice analysis, most scholars have a simpler explanation
- partisan politics.57 While conceding the force of such political argu
ments, Steams astutely points out thatthey cannot account for several
anomalies in the standing cases or explain why this doctrine has per
sisted despite the Court's shift from predominantly Democratic to
Republican appointees (pp. 216, 280-81). For instance, crass politics
should have led the "law and order" Burger and Rehnquist Courts to
shut the federal courthouse doors to accused and convicted criminals,
yet the opposite has occurred. The reason, Stearns says, is that crimi
nals are not ideologues trying to manipulate the evolution of legal doc
trine, but rather are alleging the most serious kind of individual injury
- that they will be unlawfully imprisoned or executed.58 In any event,

52. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (summarizing Valley
Forge).

53. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see also supra notes 47-50 and accompa
nying text (examining Allen).
54. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
55. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), discussed supra notes 42-43 and ac
companying text; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (invalidating
Congress's grant of standing to "any person" to enforce the Endangered Species Act); infra
notes 70-72 and accompanying text (analyzing Lujan).
56. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (allowing developers to sue a gov
ernment agency that prevented them from proceeding in order to safeguard endangered
species); Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (conferring stand
ing on homeowners who challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute limiting the li
ability of nuclear power plants, and upholding this law).
57. See, e.g. , Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 635, 659 (1985) ("One could perhaps be forgiven for confusing standing's
agenda with that of the New Right."). Instead of accusing federal courts of consciously en
gaging in raw politics, attitudinal theorists suggest that judges' political backgrounds influ
ence their decisionmaking in empirically demonstrable ways, regardless of whether they are
aware of this fact.
58. Pp. 163-64, 203-04, 262-63, 273-74. Stearns distinguishes those few decisions that
seem to hold to the contrary. For example, he maintains that in Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S.
1012 (1976), the Court properly declined to permit Gary Gilmore's mother to allege that his
conviction and death penalty were unconstitutional, because the son alone had standing to
raise these claims and thereby force the Court to create constitutional law. Pp. 168, 179, 20507, 209, 250, 256-58, 260, 264. Similarly, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983),
the Court would have allowed Lyons to sue for damages resulting from the police depart
ment's application of a dangerous "choke hold" to him, but correctly denied him standing to
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he criticizes political explanations as "nonfalsifiable": one cannot
prove or disprove hidden motives that are not expressed in opinions
(pp. 280-81).
But standing decisions do reflect, if not partisan politics, a broader
political theory. Indeed, that theory forms Stearns's second premise:
the Constitution imposes strict standing requirements because our
democracy requires minimal judicial interference with the political
branches. We submit, on the contrary, that standing sabotages the
constitutional will of "We the People," who authorized the federal ju
diciary to check Congress and the President so that they neither ex
ceed their delegated powers nor violate anyone's constitutional
rights.59 Before developing this thesis further, however, we will first at
tempt to refute Stearns's argument that the historical evidence sup
ports his social choice theory of standing.
B.

The History of Standing
1.

The New Deal Era

Stearns's version of events may be summarized as follows. By 1941,
President Roosevelt had appointed a majority of the justices, who
agreed doctrinally on two critical constitutional issues: the validity of
the New Deal and the incorrectness of the substantive due process ju
risprudence epitomized in Lochner v. New Yorll'° (pp. 220-22, 228-29).
The emerging liberal Court developed standing to foreclose attacks on
progressive legislation in the reactionary lower federal courts, which
would have sustained such challenges and thereby compelled the
Supreme Court to issue substantive constitutional rulings (pp. 36-37,
226-28). These holdings would have differed radically from those of
the preceding era, which had sharply limited the power of Congress
and the states to address social and economic ills (pp. 226-29). Such
wholesale reversals would have exacted a high political cost, exposing
the Court as nakedly partisan and damaging its credibility and per
ceived impartiality (p. 226).
We are skeptical of Stearns's account of New Deal history for two
reasons. First, from 1937 to 1942, the justices had no qualms about exrequest an injunction (and thereby raise constitutional claims) on behalf of unknown future
choke hold victims. Pp. 168, 204-07, 209, 256, 258, 260.
59. This argument has been fleshed out in Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Sepa
ration of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV . 393 (1996) [hereinafter
Pushaw, Justiciability].
60. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Stearns acknowledges that the Court eventually became split on
whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause should be interpreted as incor
porating the entire Bill of Rights against the states (the Black/Douglas position) or only
those rights that were fundamental (the Frankfurter view). Pp. 229-30. Nonetheless, he
stresses that this division was bipolar, and that therefore the justices could predict the out
come of any particular case. P. 230.
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plicitly rejecting the substantive constitutional decisions of even their
very recent predecessors.61 For example, the Court repudiated long
established limits on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause62
and decades of substantive <;lue process cases that had thwarted state
economic legislation.63 The Court paid little political price for this
about-face because the vast majority of Americans (and the political
officials they elected) supported this trend. Moreover, any resulting
institutional costs to the Court (e.g., being perceived as applying po
litical rather than legal principles) seem to have been far less than the
damage to its prestige caused by the intransigence of the conservative .
justices in the early 1930s.
Second, Steams argues that, without standing, the reactionary fed
eral district and appellate judges would have cleverly distinguished the
Supreme Court's new decisions on substantive constitutional law
(pp. 226-28). In particular, they would have struck down progressive
legislation that the Court had not yet specifically considered, thereby
forcing its hand. But we think the justices would have been unwise to
choose standing as the principal tool to discipline lower federal courts.
If these sly Neanderthal judges could distinguish the Court's seemingly
unequivocal substantive holdings, why could they not also manipulate
the Court's new standing doctrine - which was largely discretionary
and very malleable - to grant plaintiffs access and rule on the mer
its?64 Steams leaves this question unanswered.65

61. Stearns recognizes this phenomenon, pp. 218, 221-26, but not its tendency to under
mine his thesis.
62. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (allowing Congress to regulate a
farmer's growth of wheat for personal consumption, despite previous cases holding that
"commerce" did not include production and that Congress could not reach activity that oc
curred entirely within a state); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(sustaining the National Labor Relations Act by overruling an unbroken line of precedent
which had established that labor was not a matter of interstate commerce). For a detailed
analysis of the New Deal Court's overhaul of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Grant S.
Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles
to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85
IOWA L. REV. 1, 79-83 (1999); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the
Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 715-16 (2002).
63. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state mini
mum wage law even though the Court had struck down a virtually identical statute the year
before as a violation of employers' substantive due process right to freedom of contract).
64. Again, Stearns acknowledges the prudential and flexible nature of standing, pp. 4,
30, 161-62, but not its negative implications for his argument.
65. A complete explanation would require an intensive study of lower federal court
cases from that era. Thus, Stearns's claims are not supported by adequate empirical evi
dence.
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The Warren Court

Almost everyone agrees that the Warren Court relaxed standing to
facilitate implementation of its liberal agenda.66 First, its activist crea
tion of new constitutional rights would have been hollow without
plaintiffs to enforce them, especially those who had no real remedy in
the political branches (such as minorities and criminal defendants).
Second, the Court sought to effectuate Great Society legislation, al
lowing Congress to authorize statutory enforcement by plaintiffs who
had suffered generalized harms with no common law antecedent (e.g.,
the right to a clean environment or to live in an integrated commu
nity).
Stearns accepts this account, but uses social choice theory to com
plement it (pp. 231-34). He contends that, because a solid majority on
the Warren Court shared a liberal ideology (with at most bipolar divi
sions on a few issues), the justices could accurately predict how critical
legal questions would be defined and resolved (p. 232). Again, al
though social choice provides a fresh perspective, the obvious political
explanation seems to us to be the better one.
3.

The Burger and Rehnquist Courts

Stearns demonstrates that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts split
into three camps: (1) liberal holdovers like Brennan and Marshall,
later joined by Blackmun, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer; (2) conser
vatives such as Burger, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas who would
overrule precedent they deemed incorrect; and (3) pragmatic moder
ates who were generally committed to precedent (e.g., White, Stewart,
Powell, O'Connor, and Kennedy) (pp. 219-20, 234-38). The justices
could not be sure that, in codifying their preferred legal outcomes in
case decisions, the will of the present majority would be reflected
(pp. 239-44). For instance, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,67 Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy voted to uphold Roe v. Wade68 on stare deci
sis grounds, even though their previously expressed position was that
Roe had been wrongly decided (pp. 16-23, 129-30).
According to Stearns, the justices often concluded that because
they could not predict the result, it was better not to risk deciding the
merits (p. 244). Furthermore, as always, the Court could use standing
to foster democratic lawmaking by thwarting ideological litigants who
wanted to create positive law that lacked current legislative support
(pp. 239, 244).

66. The following summary draws on Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 464.
67. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Stearns's analysis ingeniously reveals why the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts not only reaffirmed, but actually expanded, the
standing doctrine developed by their liberal forebears.69 Unfortu
nately, however, he cannot explain perhaps the most significant
standing case of the past half century, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.7°
There the Court struck down a provision of the Endangered Species
Act authorizing "any person" to sue to enjoin federal agencies from
violating that statute.71 Justice Scalia maintained that Article III
banned such "generalized grievances" that the government had failed
to comply with the law, and instead limited federal courts to vindicat
ing the rights of individuals.72
Under Stearns's model, however, the Court should have deferred
to Congress's exercise of its legislative power to affirmatively create
law (to protect endangered species) and to determine who best could
enforce that law (private citizens).73 For the same reason, Stearns can
not justify Bennett v. Spear,74 which granted standing under the same
Endangered Species Act "citizen suit" provision to developers who
claimed economic harm when the government invoked that Act to
halt their project.75 The Court thus has flouted an express statutory di
rective by denying standing to those attempting to preserve endan
gered species, yet welcoming entrepreneurs who want to harm such
creatures.
Stearns concedes that Lujan and Bennett undercut his thesis
that the Court takes an apolitical, nonideological approach to standing
in order to preserve Congress's ability to make laws reflecting
majoritarian preferences (pp. 271 , 281-93). Despite these and a
few other unruly cases, however, he contends that his social choice
69. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 467, 475-76 (describing the Burger
Court's addition of two Article III requirements, causation and redressability). Social choice
theory also clarifies certain seeming anomalies in the standing cases, such as the conservative
Court's liberal grant of access to criminal defendants. See supra notes 57-58 and accompa
nying text. Social choice analysis here is superior to an attitudinalist or political model, which
would likely predict that conservative justices would restrict the standing of criminals.
Alternatively, however, this jurisprudence might reflect the conservative abhorrence to
government overreaching, which has the most devastating individual consequences in the
criminal area. Thus, the Court may be willing to confer standing generously for the purpose
of monitoring law enforcement officials to guarantee core liberties, although it will give
those officials considerable latitude. Concededly, sensitivity to criminal procedural rights has
not been a hallmark of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
70. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
71. Id. at 558-59, 571-73 (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 1536).
72. Id. at 573-78.
73. The plaintiffs in Lujan were not trying to persuade the Court to make positive law in
an area where Congress had chosen not to act; rather, they were simply asking the Court to
apply a law that Congress had passed. Id. at 559.
74. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
75. Id. at 175.
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paradigm makes sense of more precedent than any other approach
(pp. 281, 301). We, on the other hand, believe that one political theory
can explain nearly every standing case.
·

C. A Competing Model ofStanding
The Court has always defended its standing decisions as dictated
by the Constitution's creation of a democracy with a uniquely limited
judiciary.76 This idea traces to Progressive scholars like Woodrow
Wilson, who argued that the American Constitution, with its emphasis
on checks and balances, inhibited the effective governance that mod
ern conditions demanded.77 Instead, these intellectuals championed
the English parliamentary system, which featured a unified legisla
tive/executive "sovereign" (i.e., a plenary lawmaking authority) unen
cumbered by judicial review of statutes.78
Depression era politicians largely adopted this approach, as
President Roosevelt and Congress worked hand-in-hand to craft the
New Deal, but federal judges often invalidated this legislation.79 Felix
Frankfurter solved this problem by creating - and persuading his
fellow justices to adopt - a standing doctrine that incorporated the
Wilsonian notion that the judiciary should avoid interfering with the
sovereign political branches.80 JUstice Frankfurter did not, however,
candidly acknowledge that he was responding to the practical reality
of a vastly expanded federal government that might generate an un
manageable volume of litigation. Rather, he insisted that his approach
implemented the Constitution's text, history, precedent, and political
theory.81
Justice Frankfurter asserted that Article III reinforced basic
separation-of-powers principles by restricting standing in federal court
76. See, e.g. , Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19-26 (1998) (supporting this
proposition by citing numerous standing cases from the Hughes, Stone, Vinson, Warren,
Burger, and Rehnquist Courts).

77. See, e.g. , WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885) and
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1908).
78. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 7-11 , 34-35, 84-86, 222, 252-61 (1991) (de
scribing this concept of "monistic democracy").
79. Most ominously, the Court struck down the centerpiece of the New Deal, the Na
tional Industrial Recovery Act, in A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935).
80. His seminal opinion is in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460-70 (1939) (Frank
furter, J., concurring). The full Court definitively embraced Justice Frankfurter's approach
in Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. , 342 U.S. 429 (1952). For a discussion of Frankfurter's singular
influence on modern standing doctrine, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article Ill's
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447, 452-53 (1994).
81. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Joint Anti
Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150-60 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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to those who could demonstrate an "injury."82 Determining whether a
plaintiff had suffered a cognizable "injury" depended upon the sub
stantive law he invoked.
As to statutes, Justice Frankfurter urged judicial deference to
Congress's judgment about who was "injured."83 Hence, Congress had
sole power to define substantive rights (including novel ones with no
common law analogue) and to decide which persons could vindicate
those rights judicially - government agencies, individuals whose pri
vate law rights had been directly invaded by the alleged violation of
the statute, citizens acting as private attorneys general, or some com
bination.84 Conversely, if Congress had not conferred standing in a
particular statute, and the plaintiff instead relied upon the
Administrative Procedure Act's general provision allowing suit by
those "adversely affected" by an agency's action, the Court would
deny standing unless the plaintiff credibly alleged a personal injury of
the sort recognized by property, tort, or contract law.85
Although the foregoing approach comported with the original con
stitutional design,86 Justice Frankfurter went awry when he extended
his test for implied statutory standing - individualized, common law
injury - to all claims arising under the Constitution.87 Such a test (and
a corresponding prohibition on third party standing) might be defensi
ble as applied to those constitutional clauses guaranteeing individual
rights,88 but certainly not to those that either protect collective rights
82. See, e.g., Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-64, 468-70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also
McGrath, 341 U.S. at 149-52, 157-60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
83. For an insightful analysis of the evolution of this approach to statutory standing, see
JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 36-37 (1978).
84. For example, the Court upheld the Communications Act of 1934, which authorized
citizens to sue to vindicate "the public interest in communications," even if they had no "pri
vate rights" at stake. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942)
(Frankfurter, J., for the Court).
85. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also McGrath, 341
U.S. at 152 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This aspect of Justice Frankfurter's analysis incor
porated existing precedent. See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 13738 (1939). Steams nicely summarizes the Court's new approach to standing. Pp. 227-29.
86. Separation of powers demands that federal courts respect Congress's policy deter
mination about how the legal rights it has created can be enforced most effectively. Thus, for
example, from the beginning of the Republic, Congress has allowed standing to citizens gen
erally to bring various "public actions" to ensure the government's compliance with the law.
See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 481-83.
87. See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 150-54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (contending that, in
the absence of an express congressional grant of standing, the plaintiff had to show an indi
vidualized injury to a private legal interest in order to pursue an action under a federal stat
ute or the Constitution); see also Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460, 464, 468-70 (Frankfurter, J., con
curring) (to similar effect).
88. Such an approach promotes liberty by allowing the person whose constitutional
rights have been infringed to decide whether or not to litigate. If at least one potential plain
tiff has the ability to enforce a constitutional provision protecting individual rights, that
clause remains viable, and the government will be deterred from violating it. Conversely, the
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(such as the Establishment Clause) or structure the government (e.g.,
most of Articles I and 11).89 To say that no one has standing to vindi
cate these collective or structural provisions, unless perhaps Congress
specifically lets them, turns the Constitution on its head.90
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter and his current judicial disciples have
failed to grasp that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution shifted
sovereignty from the government to "the People;" who ·delegate cer
tain powers to their representatives in all three government depart
ments.91 Thus, the federal courts' power is coextensive with - not in
ferior to - that of Congress and the President.92 ·. Similarly, the
Constitution limits all three branches, not just the judiciary.93 More
over, federal judges are not unrepresentative because they are
unelected. Rather, the People removed judges from the electoral pro
cess to ensure their independence in representing the People through
the exercise of judicial power, especially by upholding the
Constitution against transient majoritarian pressures.94 Thus, federal

particularized injury requirement prevents meddlers from asserting the individual constitu
tional rights of those who choose not to press them. For elaborations of this argument, see
Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV.. 297, 306-10 (1979); Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at

486.

89. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 485-87.
90. The claim that Congress alone can authorize standing to enforce the Constitution

assumes that the political branches have power to preclude judicial review over their own
actions that allegedly violate the Constitution. A central reason that "the People" adopted a
written Constitution establishing an independent judiciary, however, was that the political
branches cannot be trusted to impartially interpret restrictions on their own authority. See
Pusha'w, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 485-88.
91 . The pathbreaking history on the development and implications of popular sover
eignty is GORDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
259-63, 272-83, 291-343, 362-63, 372-89, 453-63, 530-53, 596-609 (1969). For a discussion of
the influence of Wood and other intellectual historians on constitutional Jaw scholars, see
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "Dear John " Letters: Advi
sory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473, 495-96 (1998).
92. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Defense of the Nev-Federalist Interpretation of Article Ill, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847, 895-96

(agreeing with Akhil Amar that this "coextensiveness principle" was an axiom of Federalist
political thought); see also Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 397-99, 415-19, 427, 451,
469-72, 478 (arguing that the modern Court's approach to justiciability undermines the coor
dinate role of the judicial branch).
93. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 397-98, 411, 425-27, 467-69, 478, 485.
94 . Hamilton made this precise argument in THE FEDERALIST No. 78. He crystallized
an idea that had been evolving over the previous decade, as documented in WOOD, supra
note 91, at 259-63, 273-82, 291-343, 383-89, 453-63, 549; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 823,
826-28 (2001) (describing the Federalist precept that independent federal judges represent

the People through adjudication, especially by reviewing constitutional claims); Pushaw,
Justiciability, supra note 59, at 398-99, 41 1, 420-25, 455, 467-69, 478 (contending that standing

and similar jurisdictional doctrines ignore this principle).
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courts must "interfere" with (i.e., check) the political branches when
they exceed the constitutional powers granted to them by the People.95
In short, the Frankfurter-inspired standing doctrine frustrates
separation of powers by allowing federal courts to abdicate their
role of enforcing the Constitution: For present purposes, however,
it does not matter whether the political theory underlying standing
is right or wrong. The relevant point is that the Court has consistently
implemented this theory: that judicial review is presumptively
illegitimate because federal courts are peculiarly "limited" in our
separation-of-powers scheme compared to the "democratic" political
branches, and that this presumption can be rebutted only by a plaintiff
who can demonstrate an individualized injury caused by the defen
dant.
Indeed, the only. major standing case that does not fit this model is
Flast v. Cohen.96 There, the Warren Court permitted taxpayers to
claim that the federal government's support for religious schools vio
lated the Establishment Clause, even though no individual taxpayer
could show an injury distinct from that suffered by all citizens.97 Inter
estingly, however, the Court did not set forth the new concept of
separation of powers that apparently drove its decision: that aggres
sive checking of the political branches to protect constitutional rights
(broadly defined) outweighed the' efficiency interest of the political
branches in acting without judicial interference.98 Rather, the Court
purported to do nothing more than follow the established "limited ju
diciary" rationale of standing.99
Consequently, it was easy for the Burger Court to revive the
Frankfurterian notion of English constitutionalism, both in rhetoric
and in reality. Indeed, every Burger Court standing decision reflects
this idea, which was nicely encapsulated in Allen v. Wright:100 standing
"define[s] with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of
powers on which the Federal Government is founded," and thus re
flects " 'concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of
the courts in a democratic society.' " 101
As to constitutional claims, the Burger Court emasculated Flast in
the Valley Forge case, which denied taxpayers standing under the
Establishment Clause because they had alleged a generalized griev
ance that the government had violated the Constitution, not a per95. See id. at 398-99, 432, 469, 478, 485-89.
96. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
97. Id. at 91-106.
98. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 464.
99. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 92-95, 97, 101.
100. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
101. Id. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
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sonal "common law" injury resulting from such unlawful conduct.102
Similarly, in Richardson103 and Schlesinger,104 the Court ruled that no
plaintiff could demonstrate a unique harm flowing from Congress's
violation of Article I's provisions requiring a public accounting of all
expenditures and prohibiting Congressmen from serving at the same
time in the executive branch.105 By contrast, the Court granted stand
ing to criminal petitioners who alleged that unconstitutional conduct
by law enforcement officials had directly injured them, but not to third
parties who were unaffected by the government's actions.106
Turning to statutory standing, the Burger Court followed Justice
Frankfurter's script to the · letter. For . example, it deferred to
Congress's decision to confer broad standing to vindicate the Fair
Housing Act, which created a novel "right" - a right to live in an in
tegrated community - that had no common law analogue.107 Con
versely, if Congress had not specifically granted such widespread
standing, the justices prudentially declined to infer it.108
The Rehnquist Court has continued the restrictive approach to
standing to raise constitutional claims.109 As to statutory standing, the
Court has sometimes departed from Justice Frankfurter's precise
analysis, but not from his underlying constitutional theory. If, as
Frankfurter asserted, the Constitution requires an individualized in
jury, then Congress cannot grant broader standing, any more than it
can pass a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. Under this reason
ing, the Court in Lujan properly refused to countenance such an un
constitutional statute, even though its predecessors had mistakenly

102. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Arns. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
103. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
104. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
105. Cases like Valley Forge, Richardson, and Schlesinger effectively delete the constitu
tional clauses at issue. The political branches refuse to obey them, the judiciary declines to
enforce them, and the political remedy of voting is useless because the majority of citizens
do not care if the government violates these constitutional provisions. See Pushaw, Justi
ciability, supra note 59, at 487-89.
106. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
107. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. , 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972), the Court
permitted "testers" with no interest in obtaining housing to claim that a company had vio
lated the Fair Housing Act by racially discriminating in conveying information about this
housing. For similar holdings, see Havens Realty v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982);
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-15 (1979); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977).
108. See, e.g. , Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
109. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-20 (1997) (reaffirming the Court's "in
sist[ence] on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement [i.e., of a par
ticularized personal injury]," which is applied in an "especially rigorous" manner to constitu
tional attacks on a coordinate federal branch).
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done so out of misguided deference to Congress.11° Conversely,
Bennett v. Spear111 correctly found standing because the developers
alleged that they had personally suffered economic loss - the quintes
sential common law injury.112
In short, the Rehnquist Court has taken Justice Frankfurter's
premises to their logical extreme. The Court believes that it is faith
fully adhering to the Constitution's command that the "inferior" and
"limited" federal judiciary must leave the "sovereign" and "demo
cratic" political branches undisturbed, even if they are violating the
law, unless they happen to cause someone a traditional kind of injury.
This theory undergirds nearly every modem standing decision.
III.

CONCLUSION

Maxwell Stearns asks that his book be judged on two levels. First,
he declares that his social choice analysis should be deemed a success
if it contributes to our understanding of the Supreme Court's deci
sionmaking process and its implications for the evolution of constitu
tional doctrine (pp. 216-17). Second, Steams asserts that his model is
better than all the others, in the sense that it explains more data, in
cluding anomalies that no other theory can rationalize (pp. 217, 27981 ).
We are not quite persuaded by this second, bolder claim.
Nonetheless, Stearns has convinced us that any serious constitutional
law scholar must consider his social choice theory in formulating cri
tiques based on doctrine, history, politics, or any other discipline. In
this respect, he has made an original, important, and enduring contri
bution to the study of constitutional law.

1 10. If the judiciary's constitutional role is solely to vindicate individual rights, then
Justice Scalia is correct that neither the Constitution nor Congress can force federal courts to
hear general claims that the government has not followed the law. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992). Again, we are arguing here that the Court has logically
applied a single political theory in its standing cases, not that we agree with this theory. In
deed, the Lujan Court ignored two centuries of American history authorizing public law ac
tions to ensure the government's compliance with the law, which in turn incorporated an
cient English practices. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 483-85.
1 1 1 . 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
112. Id. at 167-68, 176-77.

